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Abstract The reinforcement axiom roughly states that when an alterna-
tive is selected by two di§erent constituencies, it must also be selected by
their union. Hare and Coombs rules are special cases of sequential positional
voting rules which are known to violate this axiom. In this paper, we Örst
show that reinforcement can be violated by all such rules. We then evaluate,
by the use of Monte Carlo simulations and the Fishburn-Gehrlein technique,
the proportion of proÖles at which this phenomenon occurs.
1 Introduction
In the theoretical debate on the attractiveness of Condorcet consistent
social choice methods on the one hand, and positional (or scoring) systems
- voting ‡ la Borda - on the other hand, the two strongest arguments in fa-
vor of the second type of mechanisms are the participation axiom and the
Youngís reinforcement axiom (YRA). Roughly, according to the participa-
tion axiom, no voter can take advantage of not taking part to the election.
For more details, see Nurmi (2005) or Mbih, Moyouwou and Zhao (2006)
among others. In this contribution, we are only interested in YRA.
The notion of reinforcement was Örst introduced by Smith (1973), under
the name of separability. The intuition is as follows: if two di§erent blocks
of individuals rank an alternative at least as high as some other alterna-
tive, then so does the combination of the blocks with regard to these two
alternatives.
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In the same way - and indeed at the same period - Young (1974, 1975)
proposes a variant of the notion of separability, which he calls consistency.
Following this idea, if two disjoint groups of individuals separately select two
non-disjoint subsets of alternatives, then the union of these groups should
exactly select the intersection of the two subsets. In fact, the di§erence be-
tween the two contributions lies in the type of social choice mechanisms
studied: Young is concerned with social choice correspondences (selecting
possibly more than a single alternative), while Smith is interested in aggre-
gation functions (selecting a social ranking of alternatives from preferences
reported by individual voters).
And Önally, in the special context of social choice functions (correspon-
dences selecting a unique outcome), Moulin (1988) introduces the phrase
Youngís reinforcement axiom.
Actual situations where this phenomenon could have arisen can also be
found. In France, President Georges Pompidou and more recently President
Jacques Chirac both abandoned the idea of submitting to the vote of the
CongrËs de Versailles, the bills on the reduction of the presidentís term of
o¢ce from seven to Öve years in 1973 and the status of French Polynesia
1999, respectively, although those bills had been voted in both AssemblÈe
Nationale and SÈnat.
In the Condorcet-Borda debate, arguments in favor of positional rules
(PR), based on the notion of reinforcement, are summarized in Youngís
theorem (1975). This theorem shows that all PR satisfy YRA whereas there
is no Condorcet consistent social choice procedure satisfying YRA.
There is no doubt about the importance of this result. However it does
not take into consideration the potentially sequential aspects of positional
rules. This paper is speciÖcally concerned with sequential positional rules
(see DeÖnition 6), whose famous examples are the well-known Hare and
Coombs methods.
Our goal is to examine precise conditions at which violations of Youngís
reinforcement axiom are susceptible to arise under sequential positional
rules. Our main contribution in this context states that all sequential po-
sitional rules violate this axiom. This normative contribution is completed
by a measure of the quantitative signiÖcance of the violation of YRA.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 is a pre-
sentation of the general framework with deÖnitions, assumptions and some
examples. Section 3 provides some general results on the behavior of se-
quential positional rules vis-‡-vis the reinforcement axiom. Then, Section 4
studies the precise conditions at which a proÖle may violate the axiom, and
frequencies are given in Section 5; Önally, Section 6 discusses and concludes
the paper.
2 Notations and deÖnitions
Consider a Önite set N of n individuals or voters, with n ! 2 and a Önite set
A of m alternatives. And suppose two disjoint groups (or constituencies)
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T1 and T2 of individuals, and T1 [ T2 = N: Let 2
A be the set of nonempty
subsets of A. Assume that the preference relation Ri of individual i, i 2 N ,
is a complete, antisymmetric and transitive binary relation (or simply a
linear order) on A and let L = fRk : 1 % k % m!g be the set of all linear
orders on A.
A proÖle is an n-tuple RN = (Ri)i2N of individual preference relations,
one for each individual. The set of all proÖles on N will be denoted by LN .
Similarly proÖles on T1 and T2 will be denoted R
T1 and RT2 , respectively.
DeÖnition 1 Given T ' N , a social choice function (SCF) is a mapping
f from LT to A.
In other words, an SCF assigns a single alternative to each proÖle. We
now present the YRA property more formally.
DeÖnition 2 Given T1 and T2, an SCF f satisÖes YRA if for any R
T1 2
LT1 and RT2 2 LT2 and for all x 2 A,!
f(RT1) = x and f(RT2) = x
"
=) f(RN ) = x
Alternatively,
DeÖnition 3 Given T1 and T2, an SCF f violates YRA if there exist R
T1 2
LT1 , RT2 2 LT2 and fx; yg ' A, x 6= y, such that
f(RT1) = x, f(RT2) = x and f(RN ) = y
An illustration of this notion will be presented in Example 1.
Now, we need additional notations to present the family of SCF s under
study in the present paper. For each Rk in L, let nk be the total number
of individuals in N with preference relation Rk. In particular with A =
fx; y; zg, the set of linear orders on A is:
R1 : xyz; R2 : xzy; R3 : yxz; R4 : yzx; R5 : zxy; R6 : zyx
Given B 2 2A such that jBj ! 2 and x 2 B, let r (B; x; k) be the rank,
according to Rk, of x among alternatives in B. A scoring vector is a jBj-
tuple v =
#
v1; :::; vr; :::; vjBj
$
of real numbers such that v1 = 1, vjBj = 0 and
for all r = 1; :::; jBj + 1, vr ! vr+1. When B is the issue, each individual
gives vr points to the alternative in B he ranks at the r
th position.
DeÖnition 4 Given B 2 2A, T ' N , RT 2 LT ; x 2 B and a scoring vector
v 2 RjBj:
i) Sc
#
B; x;RT ; v
$
, the score of x is deÖned as follows: Sc
#
B; x;RT ; v
$
=
jBj!
5
k=1
vr(B;x;k) , nk
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ii) with bB = &x 2 B : Sc #B; y;RT ; v$ ! Sc #B; x;RT ; v$ for all y 2 B'
as the set of alternatives with the smallest score, l
#
B;RT ; v
$
is the losing
alternative and is such that l
#
B;RT ; v
$
=8><
>:
bB if bB is a singleton,
g( bB) otherwise,
where g is a mechanism used to break ties among alternatives in bB.
Note that the mechanism g introduced in the deÖnition above is still
quite general and can take di§erent forms: a chance mechanism, the power
given to a chairman, the lexicographic order of the alternatives, etc. We will
later give precision about the type of mechanism we use in this paper.
In social choice processes using positional rules, the winning alternative
is the one with the highest score, as stated in the following deÖnition.
DeÖnition 5 Let B 2 2A, T ' N and a scoring vector v 2 RjBj, a posi-
tional rule (PR) is a social choice function f such that
8RT 2 LT , 8x 2 B, f(RT ) = x if [Sc
#
B; x;RT ; v
$
! Sc
#
B; y;RT ; v
$
8y 2 B, x 6= y], with ties broken by some mechanism.
From the deÖnitions above, it appears that given some issue B, a PR is
deÖned by a vector v 2 RjBj. We can then express three usual procedures:
plurality rule if v = (1; 0; :::; 0); antiplurality rule if v = (1; :::; 1; 0) and
Borda rule if v = (1; m#2
m#1 ; :::;
m#r
m#1 ; :::;
1
m#1 ; 0).
We now introduce the sequential positional rules (SPR) under consider-
ation all along our study.
Let V A =
&
vm; :::; vjBj; :::; v2
'
is a collection of scoring vectors, each
vector vjBj being associated with each possible cardinality jBj of the subset
B ' A, jBj ! 2. At the Örst step of the sequential process, scores are
computed using the vector vm and the losing alternative is eliminated. In
the next step, vector vm#1 is used to compute the scores and again the
losing alternative is eliminated. The sequential process is repeated until a
simple majority winner is obtained (see Lepelley 1996).
More formally,
DeÖnition 6 A sequential positional rule (SPR) is a social choice func-
tion f such that given B ' A, RN 2 LN and V A =
&
vm; :::; vjBj; :::; v2
'
,
f(RN ) = Am, with Am sequentially deÖned in the following way:
A1 = A
A2 = A+ l
#
A1; R
N ; vm
$
...
AjBj+1 = AjBj + l
#
AjBj; R
N ; vm#jBj+1
$
...
Am = Am#1 + l
#
Am#1; R
N ; v2
$
, with jAmj = 1
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In order to illustrate this deÖnition, let us consider the three-alternative
case. We then have vA =
&
v3; v2
'
, with v3 = (1; 9; 0), 0 % 9 % 1, where
1, 9 and 0 are the scores of the alternatives ranked Örst, second and third,
respectively, in individual preference relations in the Örst step, and v2 =
(1; 0). More generally, given a proÖle of individual preferences, the total
score of an alternative is the sum of individual scores, over the whole set
of individuals. A PR selects the alternative with the highest score. As a
di§erence, an SPR Örst eliminates the alternative with the smallest score at
the Örst step, and then selects the alternative with the highest score at the
new step, among the remaining ones. Note that with three alternatives, the
second step is simply a pairwise majority contest between the two remaining
alternatives. Also note that for 9 equal to 0, 1, or 1=2 in v3, we obtain Hareís
Procedure (HP), Coombs Procedure (CP) and Iterative Borda Procedure
(IBP), respectively.
Smith (1973) studies iterative - as distinguished from sequential - posi-
tional rules and he shows that they violate YRA. Under iterative positional
rules, at each step the scoring vector changes only with respect to the num-
ber of alternatives, while for sequential positional voting rules, there is no
Öxed relation between two scoring vectors of di§erent steps: for example, we
may use plurality at step 1 and antiplurality at step 2, etc. Iterative posi-
tional rules are thus special cases of sequential positional rules. In the next
section, we shall show that all SPRs violate YRA provided that jAj ! 3 and
n ! 15.
An illustration of the violation of YRA by SPRs, is given in Example 1.
Example 1 Suppose the SPR is the Hare procedure, that is vA =
&
v3; v2
'
,
with v3 = (1; 0; 0) and v2 = (1; 0). Let A = fx; y; zg, T1; T2 ' N , and
assume that RT1 2 LT1 and RT2 2 LT2 are as below:
RT1 RT2
0 16 25 0 15 0
x x y y z z
y z x z x y
z y z x y x
0 15 10 0 20 0
x x y y z z
y z x z x y
z y z x y x
Then the scores are as follows
Separate groups
1rst Step
8>>>><
>>>>:
T1 T2
Sc(A;x;RT1 ;v3)=16 Sc(A;x;RT2 ;v3)=15
Sc(A;y;RT1 ;v3)=25 Sc(A;y;RT2 ;v3)=10
Sc(A;z;RT1 ;v3)=15 Sc(A;z;RT2 ;v3)=20
Loser: z Loser: y
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2nd Step
8<
:
Sc(A#fzg;x;RT1 ;v2)=31 Sc(A#fyg;x;RT2 ;v2)=25
Sc(A#fzg;y;RT1 ;v2)=25 Sc(A#fyg;z;RT2 ;v2)=20
Winner: x Winner: x
The whole electorate: N = T1 [ T2
1rst Step
8>><
>>:
Sc(A;x;RN ;v3)=31
Sc(A;y;RN ;v3)=35
Sc(A;z;RN ;v3)=35
Loser: x
2nd Step
8<
:
Sc(A#fxg;y;RN ;v2)=35
Sc(A#fxg;z;RN ;v2)=66
Winner: z
It appears that the Hare procedure violates YRA: f(RT1) = x, f(RT2) =
x but f(RN ) = z.
In the next section, we will use the notions introduced above in order to
prove our result on the violation of YRA by SPRs.
3 General results
The aim of this section is to identify SPRs that violate YRA and conditions
on the number n of the voters, at which the phenomenon is susceptible to
arise. We Örst consider situations at which such violations can occur for all
possible scoring vectors - and it appears that this is the case roughly as soon
as the number of voters is equal to 13 or at least 15 - and then, we discuss
the case of electorates with less than 13 voters.
Proposition 1 In three-candidate elections with 13 voters or at least 15
voters, all SPRs violate Young reinforcement axiom.
Proof Let f be an SPR associated with the collection of scoring vectors
V A = f(1; 9; 0) ; (1; 0)g.
Case 1: Suppose that 1 ! 9 > 0, and n is odd. By assumption on n,
there exists a non negative integer p such that n = 13 + 2p. Consider the
following proÖles:
RT1 RT2
2 + p 0 1 + p 0 0 0
x x y y z z
y z x z x y
z y z x y x
0 3 3 0 1 3
x x y y z z
y z x z x y
z y z x y x
At the Örst step and proÖle RT1 , z collects 0 point and is ruled out of the
process. For the second step, x defeats y with 2 + p favorable votes against
1 + p for y. That is f(RT1) = x.
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At the Örst step and RT2 , x, y and z obtain respectively 3 + 49 points,
3+ 39 points and 4+ 39 points. Since 9 > 0, y gets the smallest number of
points and is then ruled out of the process. At the second step, x defeats z
with 6 favorable votes against 4 for z. That is f(RT2) = x.
At the Örst step and RN , x, y and z gather respectively 5+p+(p+ 5)9
points, 4 + p+ (p+ 5)9 points and 4 + 39 points. Since 9 > 0 and p ! 0, z
gets the smallest number of points and is ruled out of the process. At the
second step, y defeats x with 8+ p favorable votes against 5+ p for x. That
is f(RN ) = y.
Case 2: Suppose that 1 ! 9 > 0 and n is even. By assumption on n,
there exists a non negative integer p such that n = 16 + 2p. Consider the
following proÖles:
RT1 RT2
2 + p 0 1 + p 0 0 0
x x y y z z
y z x z x y
z y z x y x
0 4 4 0 1 4
x x y y z z
y z x z x y
z y z x y x
Using very similar arguments as in the previous case one can easily check
that f
#
RT1
$
= x, f
#
RT2
$
= x and f
#
RN
$
= y.
Case 3: Suppose that 9 = 0 and n is odd. Then there exists a non
negative integer p such that n = 13 + 2p. Consider the following proÖles:
RT1 RT2
3 + p 0 2 + p 0 0 0
x x y y z z
y z x z x y
z y z x y x
3 0 2 0 0 3
x x y y z z
y z x z x y
z y z x y x
At the Örst step and RT1 , z gets 0 point and is ruled out of the process.
At the second step, x defeats y with 3 + p favorable votes against 2 + p for
y. That is f(RT1) = x.
At the Örst step and RT2 , x, y and z get respectively 3 points, 2 points
and 3 points. Therefore y gets the smallest amount of points and is then
ruled out of the process. At the second step, x defeats z with 5 favorable
votes against 3 for z. That is f(RT2) = x.
At the Örst step and RN , x, y and z gather respectively 6 + p points,
4+ p points and 3 points. Since p ! 0, z gets the smallest number of points
and is ruled out of the process. At the second step, y defeats x with 7 + p
favorable votes against 6 + p for x. That is f(RN ) = y.
Case 4: Suppose that 9 = 0 and n is even. By assumption on n, there
exists a non negative integer p such that n = 16+2p. Consider the following
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proÖles:
RT1 RT2
3 + p 0 2 + p 0 0 0
x x y y z z
y z x z x y
z y z x y x
0 4 3 0 0 4
x x y y z z
y z x z x y
z y z x y x
Again, as in the previous case one can easily check that f
#
RT1
$
= x,
f
#
RT2
$
= x and f
#
RN
$
= y.
It the appears that in all cases considered above, all SPRs violate Young
reinforcement axiom; and this concludes the proof.
As a direct consequence of the preceding proposition, the following holds:
Proposition 2 With 13 voters or at least 15 voters and at least three can-
didates, all SPRs violate the Young reinforcement axiom.
Proof Suppose A = fx; y; z; a4; a5; :::; amg and let f be an SPR associated
with a collection of scoring vectors V A =
&
vm; :::; v3; v2
'
, with v2 = (1; 0)
and v3 = (1; 9; 0). Consider the four distinct cases in the proof of Propo-
sition 1 and the corresponding proÖles RT1 and RT2 . Now, construct two
new proÖles RT1 and RT2 from RT1 and RT2 respectively, in such a way
that alternative a4 appears at the fourth position in each individual prefer-
ence relation, a5 appears at the Öfth position, and so on. Each candidate in
fx; y; zg gets the same number of points as presented in the proof of Propo-
sition 1. Moreover all candidates in fx; y; zg record more points than every
candidate in fa4; a5; :::; amg until candidates in fa4; a5; :::; amg are all ruled
out of the process. It follows that the two last steps are exactly the same as
with RT1 , RT2 and RN respectively. That is f(RT1) = x, f(RT2) = x and
f(RN ) = y. Consequently, f violates the Young reinforcement axiom.
The two propositions above show that all SPRs violate YRA when the
number of voters is equal to 13 or is at least 15, provided that the number
of alternatives is at least three. Note that there is no
It remains to consider situations with only two alternatives, and elec-
torates with no more than 12 voters (and also n = 14). The discussion below
provides answers to these questions.
First, for all n 2 N; and jAj = 2, it straightforwardly appears that there
exists no SPR which violates YRA.
Second, with three alternatives, a computer based complete enumeration
program (available from the authors upon simple request) reveals that there
is no n for which all SPRs violate YRA. However, for some n and some 9,
our computation program exhibits cases of violations of YRA. It is obvious
that this is also true for four or more alternatives.
Fig. 1 below summarizes these results. It represents, for each SPR, the
frequency of violation of YRA, with respect to both n (n is between 1 and
14) and the scoring vector, with 0 % 9 % 1. SpeciÖcally, it shows that the
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best rules, according to YRA, are clearly the usual ones: Hareís Procedure,
Coombs Procedure and Iterative Borda Procedure; they minimize the fre-
quency of violation of YRA, among all SPRs.
Fig. 1 Violation of YRA for small values of n
for three alternatives, 0 % 9 % 1 and n = 1; :::; 14.
These last results also suggest that one of our main goals in this paper is
to evaluate how frequent SPRs violate YRA. In the next section, we focus
on the special case of three alternatives.
4 Violations of reinforcement
In this section we present a typology of the various preference proÖles at
which the violation of the YRA arises. As mentioned above, we only study
the three-alternative case. With four or more alternatives, computations are
much more involved.
Given A = fa1; a2; a3g, there are exactly six linear orders on A, labeled
below:
R1 : a1a2a3; R2 : a1a3a2; R3 : a2a1a3; R4 : a2a3a1; R5 : a3a1a2; R6 : a3a2a1
We Örst introduce some further notations and deÖnitions. A situation sN
is a preference proÖle obtained from a proÖle RN by rewriting it as sN =
(n1; n2; n3; n4; n5; n6); where for each k = f1; :::; 6g ; nk is the number of
individuals in N with preference relation Rk. In other words, a situation is
a 6+tuple of natural integers such that 56k=1nk = n.
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In order to take the two disjoint groups T1 and T2 into consideration,
with j 2 f1; 2g, tTj = (tj1; :::; t
j
6) denotes a preference proÖle deduced from
a proÖle RTj where tjk is the number of individuals in Tj with preference
relation Rk, and 5
6
k=1t
j
k = jTj j. Note that since T1 [ T2 = N , t
1
k + t
2
k = nk.
We now specify the mechanism we use in this paper in order to break
ties among alternatives in bB (see DeÖnition 4), that is the lexicographic
order; in other words, ties are broken in favor of the alternatives with the
smallest index, which can be written as follows:
ah beats ak ,
,
h < k ) Sc
#
B; ah; R
T ; v
$
! Sc
#
A; ak; R
T ; v
$
k < h) Sc
#
B; ah; R
T ; v
$
> Sc
#
A; ak; R
T ; v
$
where T ' N .
Notice that one can imagine many other ways to break ties: a random
mechanism, a chairman whose vote breaks ties, etc. The mechanism chosen
here - the lexicographic order - has at least two advantages: it avoids in-
troducing chance in the determination of the outcome, and it is compatible
with the anonymity of the rules since it preserves the equalitity of treat-
ment of all voters. Further, as the number of voters rises, impact of such a
mechanism becomes marginal.
Note that when the number of alternatives is reduced to three, under
an SPR, there are at most two steps in order to determine the winning
alternative. In situations with only one single step - that is, with an outcome
selected after a unique step - the winning alternative is called the Örst step
winner. We then have the proposition below.
Proposition 3 Let A = fa1; a2; a3g, B ' A, T a constituency, R
T 2 LT
and consider an SPR associated with V A = f(1; 9; 0) ; (1; 0)g. Then for all
h 2 f1; 2; 3g, alternative ah is the Örst step winner if
Sc
#
B; ah; R
T ; v3
$
>
(1 + 9) jT j
2
with (1 + 9) jT j =
3X
i=1
Sc
#
B; ai; R
T ; v3
$
Proof Since 9 2 [0; 1], we distinguish two cases: (i) First suppose 9 = 1.
Then, ah cannot be selected at the Örst step. Since the sum of the scores of
the three alternatives is equal to (1+9) jT j = 2 jT j, it follows that in order to
be selected at the Örst step, ah should have a score strictly higher than
2jT j
2 =
jT j, which is impossible. (ii) Now suppose 9 2 [0; 1[. If Sc
#
B; ah; R
T ; v3
$
>
(1+4)jT j
2 , then clearly the score of ah must be strictly higher than the
score of each of the two other alternatives in the Örst step. Furthermore, if
Sc
#
B; ah; R
T ; v3
$
> (1+4)jT j2 , then ah is a Condorcet winner, i.e. it beats
all the other alternatives in the second step. Without loss of generality,
assume h = 3: Sc
#
B; a3; R
T ; v3
$
> (1+4)jT j2 ; then, we must have 9t2 +
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9t4 + t5 + t6 >
(1+4)jT j
2 , which can be rewritten 9t2 + 9t4 + t5 + t6 >
(1+4)
2 (t1 + t2 + t3 + t4 + t5 + t6), or
(1#4)
2 t5+
(1#4)
2 t6 >
(1+4)
2 t1+
(1#4)
2 t2+
(1+4)
2 t3 +
(1#4)
2 t4, which gives t5 + t6 >
(1+4)
(1#4) t1 + t2 +
(1+4)
(1#4) t3 + t4, and
Önally t4 + t5 + t6 >
(1+4)
(1#4) t1 + t2 +
(1+4)
(1#4) t3 + 2t4. Besides, since 9 2 [0; 1[,
then (1+4)(1#4) 2 [1;+1[, hence the last inequality above implies t4 + t5 +
t6 > t1 + t2 + t3 + 2t4. And from the fact that t4 ! 0, it follows that
t4 + t5 + t6 > t1 + t2 + t3, which means that a3 beats a1 in a pairwise
contest. The same reasoning applies for a3 and a2. Thus, for any alternative
ah, if Sc
#
B; ah; R
T ; v3
$
> (1+4)jT j2 , then the alternatives di§erent from ah
cannot be selected, even if we proceed with a second step between the two
alternatives with the highest scores. And this completes the proof.
If ah wins with two steps, the inequalities susceptible to occur in each
step are as follows:
First step
8>>>><
>>>>:
Sc
#
B; ah; R
T ; v3
$
% (1+4)jT j2 (C)
Sc
#
B; ah; R
T ; v3
$
! Sc
#
A; ak; R
T ; v3
$
if h < k (D)
Sc
#
B; ah; R
T ; v3
$
> Sc
#
A; ak; R
T ; v3
$
if h > k (E)
Sc
#
B; aj ; R
T ; v3
$
! Sc
#
A; ak; R
T ; v3
$
if j < k (F)
Sc
#
B; aj ; R
T ; v3
$
> Sc
#
A; ak; R
T ; v3
$
if j > k (")
Second step
,
Sc
#
B; ah; R
T ; v2
$
! Sc
#
A; aj ; R
T ; v2
$
if h < j (H)
Sc
#
B; ah; R
T ; v2
$
> Sc
#
A; aj ; R
T ; v2
$
if h > j (I)
Below, we use sets of the Greek letters above to denote situations where
any combination of inequalities above occurs; for example fC; D; Eg means
that inequalities (C), (D) and (E) occur simultaneously.
DeÖnition 7 Let A = fa1; a2; a3g, B ' A, T a constituency, R
T 2 LT
and consider an SPR associated with V A = f(1; 9; 0) ; (1; 0)g.
i) For all distinct h; k; j 2 f1; 2; 3g, alternative ah is selected at the second
step and is called the ìsecond step winnerî if any one of the following
cases occurs:
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4
fC; D; F; Hg fC; D; F; Ig fC; D; "; Hg fC; D; "; Ig
Case 5 Case 6 Case 7 Case 8
fC; E; F; Hg fC; E; F; Ig fC; E; "; Hg fC; E; "; Ig
ii) Alternative ah is called the,
ìchallengerî if it is beaten at the second step,
ìthe loserî if it is beaten at the Örst step.
We then distinguish six potential possibilities, for the violation of YRA
to occur:
P1: An alternative is ìthe Örst step winnerî in both constituencies;
P2: An alternative is ìthe second step winnerî in both constituencies,
with the same ìchallengerî;
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P3: An alternative is ìthe Örst step winnerî in one constituency and
ìthe second step winnerî in the other one. The ìchallengerî of the second
constituency is selected in the union of the two constituencies;
P4: An alternative is ìthe Örst step winnerî in one constituency and ìthe
second step winnerî in the other one. The ìloserî of the second constituency
is selected in the union of the two constituencies, with the ìchallengerî of
the second constituency as the challenger of the whole electorate;
P5: An alternative is ìthe Örst step winnerî in one constituency and ìthe
second step winnerî in the other one. The ìloserî of the second constituency
is selected in the union of the two constituencies, with the ìthe Örst step
winnerî as the ìchallengerî of the whole electorate;
P6: An alternative is ìthe second step winnerî in both constituencies
with two di§erent ìchallengersî.
We then show that some of the possibilities above can actually lead to
the violation of YRA, while others cannot. We begin with cases at which
YRA is not violated.
Proposition 4 Let A = fa1; a2; a3g, B ' A, Tj ' N , j = 1; 2. R
T1 2 LT1
and consider an SPR associated with V A = f(1; 9; 0) ; (1; 0)g, 0 % 9 % 1.
Then, the SPR does not violate YRA if any one of the following possibilities
occurs: P1, P2, P3, P4.
Proof Without loss of generality, suppose a1 is the winner in both T1 and
T2. The proof for alternatives a2 and a3 is very similar and is then omitted.
We successively consider possibilities P1, P2, P3 and P4.
ñ P1: a1 is the Örst step winner in both constituencies. From the proof of
Proposition 3 (i), case 9 = 1 is not possible, then 0 % 9 < 1, and in
particular, the two following inequalities are true: t11 + t
1
2 + 9t
1
3 + 9t
1
5 >
(1+4)jT1j
2 (1) and t
2
1 + t
2
2 + 9t
2
3 + 9t
2
5 >
(1+4)jT2j
2 (2). Since t
1
k + t
2
k = nk,
if we add (1) and (2), we have n1 + n2 + 9n3 + 9n5 >
(1+4)n
2 . It follows
that a1 is the Örst step winner in N . Hence, violation of YRA is not
susceptible to occur.
ñ P2: a1 is the second step winner with a2 as the challenger in both con-
stituencies. Then, the following inequalities are true:8>>>>>>><
>>>>>>>:
T1
Step 1:
8>>>>><
>>>>>:
t11 + t
1
2 + 9t
1
3 + 9t
1
5 %
(1+4)jT1j
2
9t11 + t
1
3 + t
1
4 + 9t
1
6 %
(1+4)jT1j
2
9t12 + 9t
1
4 + t
1
5 + t
1
6 %
(1+4)jT1j
2
t11 + t
1
2 + t
1
3 + t
1
5 ! 9t
1
2 + 9t
1
4 + t
1
5 + t
1
6
9t11 + t
1
3 + t
1
4 + 9t
1
6 ! 9t
1
2 + 9t
1
4 + t
1
5 + t
1
6
Step 2:
&
t11 + t
1
2 + t
1
5 ! t
1
3 + t
1
4 + t
1
6
(3)
8>>>>>>><
>>>>>>>:
T2
Step 1:
8>>>>><
>>>>>:
t21 + t
2
2 + 9t
2
3 + 9t
2
5 %
(1+4)jT1j
2
9t21 + t
2
3 + t
2
4 + 9t
2
6 %
(1+4)jT2j
2
9t22 + 9t
2
4 + t
2
5 + t
2
6 %
(1+4)jT3j
2
t21 + t
2
2 + 9t
2
3 + 9t
2
5 ! 9t
2
2 + 9t
2
4 + t
2
5 + t
2
6
9t21 + t
2
3 + t
2
4 + 9t
2
6 ! 9t
2
2 + 9t
2
4 + t
2
5 + t
2
6
Step 2:
&
t21 + t
2
2 + t
2
5 ! t
2
3 + t
2
4 + t
2
6
(4)
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Then, when we add (3) and (4),8>>>>>>><
>>>>>>>:
N
Step 1:
8>>>>><
>>>>>:
9n1 + n3 + n4 + 9n6 %
(1+4)n
2
9n1 + n3 + n4 + 9n6 %
(1+4)n
2
9n2 + 9n4 + n5 + n6 %
(1+4)n
2
n1 + n2 + 9n3 + 9n5 ! 9n2 + 9n4 + n5 + n6
9n1 + n3 + n4 + 9n6 ! 9n2 + 9n4 + n5 + n6
Step 2:
&
n1 + n2 + n5 ! n3 + n4 + n6
Hence a1 is the second step winner in N . And it follows that YRA cannot
be violated.
ñ P3: a1 is the Örst step winner in T1 and the second step winner with a2 as
the challenger in T2. Clearly, 0 % 9 < 1 and in particular, t
1
1+ t
1
2+9t
1
3+
9t15 >
(1+4)jT1j
2 (5) and t
2
1+t
2
2+t
2
5 !
jT2j
2 (6). We show that a2 cannot be
elected in N . Suppose on the contrary that a2 is selected in N : in step
2, we then have n3 +n4 +n6 >
n
2 , which can be rewritten t
2
3 + t
2
4 + t
2
6| {z }
(a)
+
t13 + t
1
4 + t
1
6| {z }
(b)
> n2 . Now, consider terms (a) and (b) separately. We begin
with (a): from (6), t23 + t
2
4 + t
2
6 <
jT2j
2 . Now consider (b). We show that
t13 + t
1
4 + t
1
6 <
jT1j
2 : from (5), t
1
1 + t
1
2 + 9t
1
3 + 9t
1
5 >
(1+4)jT1j
2 , which is
equivalent to t11+ t
1
2+9t
1
3+9t
1
5 >
(1+4)
2
#
t11 + t
1
2 + t
1
3 + t
1
4 + t
1
5 + t
1
6
$
, and
can be rewritten (1#4)2 t
1
1+
(1#4)
2 t
1
2 >
(1#4)
2 t
1
3+
(1+4)
2 t
1
4+
(1#4)
2 t
1
5+
(1+4)
2 t
1
6,
or t11 + t
1
2 > t
1
3 +
(1+4)
(1#4) t
1
4 + t
1
5 +
(1+4)
(1#4) t
1
6, that is t
1
1 + t
1
2 + t
1
5 > t
1
3 +
(1+4)
(1#4) t
1
4 + 2t
1
5 +
(1+4)
(1#4) t
1
6. Since 0 % 9 < 1, 1 %
(1+4)
(1#4) % +1; hence
t13 +
(1+4)
(1#4) t
1
4 + 2t
1
5 +
(1+4)
(1#4) t
1
6 ! t
1
3 + t
1
4 + t
1
6, from which it follows that
t11 + t
1
2 + t
1
5 > t
1
3 + t
1
4 + t
1
6, and Önally t
1
3 + t
1
4 + t
1
6 <
jT1j
2 . Consequently,
from (a) and (b), we must have:
t23 + t
2
4 + t
2
6| {z }
(a)
+t13 + t
1
4 + t
1
6| {z }
(b)
< jT1j2 +
jT2j
2 , that is t
2
3 + t
2
4 + t
2
6| {z }
(a)
+t13 + t
1
4 + t
1
6| {z }
(b)
<
n
2 , which is equivalent to n3 + n4 + n6 <
n
2 , a contradiction.
We then conclude that a2 cannot be selected in N . In other words,
violation of YRA is not susceptible to occur.
ñ P4: a1 is the Örst step winner in T1 and the second step winner with
a2 as the challenger in T2. We will show that a1 cannot be the loser
in N , that is a3 cannot be selected in N with a2 as the challenger: in
particular,
,
t11 + t
1
2 + 9t
1
3 + 9t
1
5 > 9t
1
1 + t
1
3 + t
1
4 + 9t
1
6
t11 + t
1
2 + 9t
1
3 + 9t
1
5 > 9t
1
2 + 9t
1
4 + t
1
5 + t
1
6
(7) and
t21+t
2
2+9t
2
3+9t
2
5 ! 9t
2
2+9t
2
4+t
2
5+t
2
6 (8). Then, in N , we have: n1+n2+
9n3+9n5 > 9n2+9n4+n5+n6, which means that Sc(A; a1; R
N ; v3) >
Sc(A; a3; R
N ; v3). Then a1 cannot be eliminated at the Örst step. Again,
it follows that there is no violation of YRA.
Proposition 5 Let A = fa1; a2; a3g, B ' A, Tj ' N , j = 1; 2. R
T1 2 LT1
and consider an SPR associated with V A = f(1; 9; 0) ; (1; 0)g, 0 % 9 % 1.
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Then, the SPR is susceptible to violate YRA if any one of the following
possibilities occurs: P5 and P6.
Proof In order to prove our result we present an example for each possibility.
Let T1 and T2 be two constituencies.
ñ P5: Suppose a1 is the Örst step winner in T1 and is the second step
winner in T2 with a2 as the challenger; we show that a3 can be selected
in N . Assume the following situations tT1 = (0; 30; 0; 0; 20; 0) and tT2 =
(20; 0; 0; 20; 20; 0) associated with RT1 and RT2 , respectively; then, sN =
(20; 30; 0; 20; 40; 0) and the scores are as follows:
Separate groups
1rst Step
8>>>><
>>>>:
T1 T2
Sc(A;a1;R
T1 ;v3)=30+204 Sc(A;a1;R
T2 ;v3)=20+204
Sc(A;a2;R
T1 ;v3)=0+04 Sc(A;a2;R
T2 ;v3)=20+204
Sc(A;a3;R
T1 ;v3)=20+304 Sc(A;a3;R
T2 ;v3)=20+204
Losers: a2; a3 Loser: a3
2nd Step
8<
:
Sc(A#fa3g;a1;R
T2 ;v2)=40
Sc(A#fa3g;a2;R
T2 ;v2)=20
Winner: a1 Winner: a1
The whole electorate: N = T1 [ T2
1rst Step
8>><
>>:
Sc(A;a1;R
N ;v3)=50+404
Sc(A;a2;R
N ;v3)=20+204
Sc(A;a3;R
N ;v3)=40+504
Loser: a2
2nd Step
8<
:
Sc(A#fa2g;a1;R
N ;v2)=50
Sc(A#fa2g;a3;R
N ;v2)=60
Winner: a3
It follows that YRA is violated.
ñ P6: a1 is the second step winner in both constituencies with a2 (and a3)
as the challenger in T1 (and T2, respectively): We show that a2 or a3
can win in N . Assume the following situations tT1 = (18; 0; 2; 18; 17; 1)
and tT2 = (2; 16; 15; 2; 4; 18) associated with RT1 and RT2 , respectively;
then, sN = (20; 16; 17; 20; 21; 19) and the scores are as follows:
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Separate groups
1rst Step
8>>>><
>>>>:
T1 T2
Sc(A;a1;R
T1 ;v3)=18+194 Sc(A;a1;R
T2 ;v3)=18+194
Sc(A;a2;R
T1 ;v3)=20+194 Sc(A;a2;R
T2 ;v3)=17+204
Sc(A;a3;R
T1 ;v3)=18+184 Sc(A;a3;R
T2 ;v3)=22+184
Loser: a3 Loser: a2
2nd Step
8<
:
Sc(A#fa3g;a1;R
T1 ;v2)=35 Sc(A#fa2g;a1;R
T2 ;v2)=33
Sc(A#fa3g;a2;R
T1 ;v2)=21 Sc(A#fa2g;a3;R
T2 ;v2)=24
Winner: a1 Winner: a1
The whole electorate: N = T1 [ T2
1rst Step
8>><
>>:
Sc(A;a1;R
N ;v3)=36+384
Sc(A;a2;R
N ;v3)=37+394
Sc(A;a3;R
N ;v3)=40+364
Loser: a1
2nd Step
8<
:
Sc(A#fa1g;a2;R
N ;v2)=57
Sc(A#fa1g;a3;R
N ;v2)=56
Winner: a2
It follows that YRA is violated. And this completes the proof.
Retrospectively, it is noticeable that cases of violations of YRA are
closely linked to the fact that the winning alternative in all constituencies
is selected with a di§erent challenger. Intuitively, this can be interpreted as
a political situation where the two Houses are not ìmirror imagesî of each
other.
The results provided in this section will subsequently be used to write
systems of inequalities from which we will compute frequencies of violation
of YRA.
5 The likelihood of non reinforceable proÖles
Computer simulations are very often used in social choice in order to de-
termine the frequencies of paradoxes, e. g. Nitzan (1985) or Kelly (1993)
among others. The Monte Carlo simulations method, used below, is very
useful when a problem cannot be solved analytically. Its principle is simple:
(i) Örstly, we choose a probabilistic hypothesis, that is the way probabili-
ties are assigned to events; (ii) secondly, for any chosen values of t1 and t2
(the sizes of constituencies), we draw a given number of voting situations
according to the selected hypothesis; voting situations are drawn indepen-
dently, and (iii) thirdly, for each voting situation, we examine whether the
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situation induces the violation of the YRA according to the chosen scoring
rule. Thus, for each value of (t1; t2), the estimated probability of violation
of YRA is equal to the ratio
number of occurrences of violations of YRA
total number of drawn (possibly anonymous) proÖles
where an anonymous proÖle is distinguished from a proÖle in the usual sense
by the fact that in the latter the names of the voters matter and in the
Örst one they do not. To illustrate, with three voters and three alternatives,
conÖgurations of preferences (xyz; xzy; yzx) and (xyz; yzx; xzy) are distinct
proÖles in the usual sense in which individuals 2 and 3 have swapped their
preferences, but correspond to the same anonymous proÖle, where one is
interested only in the number of individuals with some preference order,
and not in the names of these individuals.
In our study, the total number of drawn situations is 100,000 (a greater
number does not signiÖcantly improve the results). To be precise, note that
the values we obtain are not exact probabilities, but rather estimates. For
example, a value equal to 0 doesnít necessarily mean that the phenomenon
cannot at all occur, but in fact, simply that its probability of occurrence is
very small.
The assumption of independence between the two constituencies, while
to some extent arbitrary, is however somewhat in accordance with the actual
situations of western democracies.
Two traditional probabilistic hypotheses are taken into account: Impar-
tial Culture (IC) and Impartial Anonymous Culture (IAC). Both are based
on an equal probability assumption, but not exactly in the same way. Ac-
cording to IC, all preference proÖles are equally likely: for each voter, every
preference order has an equal chance to be drawn (16 in the three-alternative
case); and under IAC all anonymous preference proÖles are equiprobable:
for every possible preference order, the number of voters reporting that or-
der is drawn, in such a way that the total number of voters be equal to n.
More precisely, for each n and each linear order we draw randomly the num-
ber n1 of individuals with the Örst linear order. And then, again randomly,
we draw the number n2 of individuals with the second linear order between
0 and n+ n1, and so on. For a detailed discussion of these hypotheses and
some others, see Regenwetter et al. (2006).
Then in this section, for each probabilistic hypothesis and each rule un-
der study, two series of results are provided: (a), Örst, for iterative Borda,
Coombs and Hare rules, we present tables of values and graphs correspond-
ing to some values of the total number of voters t1 + t2 , that is 25, 50, 75
and 100, and (b) for some speciÖc values of 9, we then focus on three special
cases of bicameral congresses: the French Parliament, the US Congress and
the German Parliament.
In the tables, the notation xE-y is used as an equivalent for x , 10#y,
where x and y are real numbers.
The reinforcement axiom under sequential positional rules 17
After the presentation of our results with Monte Carlo simulations, we
consider cases where the number of individuals is inÖnitely large, under the
IAC hypothesis. Within this framework, we use an analytical method - as
distinguished from computer simulations - and provide relations giving the
proportion of anonymous proÖles vulnerable to the violation of YRA.
5.1 Impartial Culture
We shall Örst consider the case where n 2 f25; 50; 75; 100g and t (the size of
any of the two constituencies) changes from 1 to at most n2 (Tables 1 and
2). Note that cases where t ! n2 are symmetrical to those where t %
n
2 . For
example, for n = 25, the results are the same with t = 1 and t = 24.
Table 1 (IC 1) Frequencies of violation of YRA for Hare,
Iterative Borda and Coombs, with n = 25 and n = 50.
Table 2 (IC 1) Frequencies of violation of YRA for Hare,
Iterative Borda and Coombs, with n = 75 and n = 100.
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For all rules under study, it appears that: (i) for any given value of n,
and for all values of t, frequencies of violation of YRA are relatively small
(generally smaller than 10#2), (ii) for any Öxed n, those frequencies slightly
rise when the value of t rises (áuctuations are due to even or odd values of
t) as illustrated in Fig. 2, 3, 4 and 5 below, (iii) for any given value of t,
frequencies decrease when n rises, (iv) it follows that frequencies are higher
as both constituencies tend to have the same size, (v) Önally, although all
frequencies are rather small, they are clearly smaller for IBP than for the
two other rules, for which they are relatively close.
Fig. 2 Frequencies of violation Fig. 3 Frequencies of violation of
of YRA under IC for Hare YRA under IC for Iterative Borda
(HP) and n 2 f25; 50; 75; 100g . (IBP) and n 2 f25; 50; 75; 100g .
Fig. 4 Frequencies of violation Fig. 5 A comparison of the three
of YRA under IC for Coombs rules, under IC, for n = 100.
(CP) and n 2 f25; 50; 75; 100g .
Now, one natural question is about the limit frequencies as n gets larger.
The table and the Ögure below provide an answer for houses with equal size.
Simulations show that (i) values of frequencies are still smaller for IBP than
for the two other rules, and (ii) they are relatively stable for HP and IBP
while they remain erratic for CP.
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Table 3 and Fig. 6 Frequencies of violation of YRA for the three
rules, under IC, with t = n2 and n = f100; 250; 500; 750; 1000g.
We now focus on three special cases of bicameral congresses. The French
Parliament is composed of two constituencies: the ìUpper Houseî, which is
the French Senate (SÈnat) with 331 members, and the ìLower Houseî, the
French National Assembly (AssemblÈe Nationale), which has 577 members.
For the German Parliament, the two constituencies are the ìFederal Coun-
cilî, named the Bundesrat, the size of which is 68 members, and the ìFederal
Dietî or Bundestag with 598 members. And Önally, the US Congress is di-
vided into the Senate on the one hand, the number of members of which is
100, and the House of Representatives on the other hand, with 435 members.
For Table 4 and Fig. 7 below, the size n of the Congress is Öxed (n = 908
for the French Parliament, and so on for the other countries); only 9 changes
from 0 to 1, and for 9 equal to 0, 1, or 1=2, we respectively obtain Hareís
Procedure, Coombs Procedure and Iterative Borda Procedure.
Table 4 (IC 3) Theoretical frequencies of violation of YRA
in some Western democracies under di§erent voting rules.
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Fig. 7 Comparison of the three Congresses under
IC and under di§erent voting rules (0 % 9 % 1).
As already noted above, frequencies are relatively greater with rather
equal size constituencies, although they are small for all values of 9. This is
shown in Figure 7 with the German curve which is lower than the US and
French curves. Besides, it must also be noticed that the three curves are
U -shaped, which means that for all of the three Congresses IBP appears as
the best procedure among the three classical ones (HP, IBP and CP) and
moreover, IBP is one of the best rules, among all iterative positional rules.
5.2 Impartial Anonymous Culture
As for IC above, we consider n = f25; 50; 75; 100g and let t change from
1 to n2 . Again, the Monte Carlo technique leads to the results provided in
Tables 5 and 6 below:
Table 5 (IAC 1) Frequencies of violation of YRA for Hare,
Iterative Borda and Coombs, with n = 25 and n = 50.
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Table 6 (IAC 2) Frequencies of violation of YRA for Hare,
Iterative Borda and Coombs, with n = 75 and n = 100.
Graphically these tables are illustrated as follows:
Fig. 8 Frequencies of violation Fig. 9 Frequencies of violation of
of YRA under IAC for Hare (HP) YRA under IAC for Iterative Borda
and n 2 f25; 50; 75; 100g . (IBP) and n 2 f25; 50; 75; 100g .
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Fig. 10 Frequencies of violation Fig. 11 A comparison of the three
of YRA under IAC for Coombs rules, under IAC, for n = 100.
(CP) and n 2 f25; 50; 75; 100g .
As a di§erence with the IC hypothesis, observation of Fig. 8, 9 and 10
does not lead to a clear conclusion. However it seems that frequencies are
higher as both constituencies tend to have the same size. Moreover, like
Fig. 5 above, Fig. 11 shows that CP is more sensitive to violations of YRA
than the two other rules. However, while under IC the performance of IBP
and CP were very close, under IAC, there seems to be no clear di§erence
between IBP and HP. This shows that, to some extent, the choice of the
probabilistic model can have an ináuence on the results: IAC is known to
assume some homogeneity within voters preferences, while IC assumes more
clearly divided views among voters. Besides, it also appears that occurrences
of paradoxes are higher under IC than under IAC (see Gehrlein 2006, chap.
5).
We now turn, in Table 7 and in Fig. 12, to the results obtained under
IAC for the three special cases of bicameral congresses.
Table 7 (IAC 3) Theoretical frequencies of violation of YRA
in some Western democracies under di§erent voting rules.
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Fig.12 Comparison of the three Congresses under
IAC and under di§erent voting rules (0 % 9 % 1).
Once again, Coombs procedure is more sensitive to the violation of YRA
than Borda and Hare procedures; but, it is not clear from our results in
Table 7 that one of these last two rules - Borda or Hare - would minimize
the probability of violation of YRA. More importantly, the paradox is clearly
unlikely to appear in the Parliaments under study.
Now, suppose the size of any one of the two constituencies is equal to
Cn, where C is a proportion of the total number of voters, provided that
Cn is an integer. Thus, a value of C equal to 0:1 means that the number of
individuals in the given constituency represents 10% of the total number of
individuals in N , which implies that the 90% other individuals are members
of the other constituency. Here, we focus on large electorates - and indeed
on inÖnite electorates - and then we assume that C can take any value in
the interval ]0; 12 ]. Further, as a di§erence with computer simulations from
which the results provided above have been obtained, we here provide exact
values of frequencies of violation of YRA. These results are obtained by use
of the technique of Fishburn and Gehrlein (1976).
Let F (9; C; n) be the likelihood that an SPR F with the vector score
V A = f(1; 9; 0) ; (1; 0)g violates YRA, for n voters. We provide closed-form
formulae giving this likelihood when n = 1 and 9 2 f0; 1g. We have not
been able to obtain results for 9 = 12 . We then can state the following
results:
Proposition 6 Let HP be the voting rule. Then F (0; C;1) =
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8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
$6(!189 517 056$+138 088 404$2+12 570 496$3!34 659 659$4+140 554 848)
277 389 791 723 520
if 82[0; 14 ]
(340 850$+2555 640$
2
!2232 960$3!83 435 520$4+587 252 736$5+235 324 320$6+
213 024 000$7!1905 300$8!19 191 680$9!325 477$10+15 503 )
4160 846 875 852 800
if 82[ 14 ;
1
3 ]
(!1139 510$+16 691 760$
2
!117 557 520$3+430 742 760$4!658 409 976$5+1379 212 800$6+
2009 688 240$7!6224 488 920$8+6610 436 380$9!2546 990 749$10+24 715 )
4160 846 875 852 800
if 82[ 13 ;
1
2 ]
Proposition 7 Let CP be the voting rule. Then F (1; C;1) =8>>>>>>>>><
>>>>>>>>>:
$6(!189 517 056$+138 088 404$2+12 570 496$3!34 659 659$4+140 554 848)
277 389 791 723 520
if 82[0; 13 ]
#694 840!23 006 250$+314 101 800$2!2374 579 800$3+11 071 468 800$4!33 160 212 540$5+
158 559 912 000$6!114 436 013 400$7+13 807 845 900$8+22 578 700 950$9!8375 899 073$10
$
81 266 540 544 000 000
if 82[ 13 ;
1
2 ]
For some values of C, we have the following results in Table 8:
Table 8 (IAC 4) Violations of YRA for Hare and
Coombs with large electorates and 0 % 9 % 1.
Graphically, in Fig. 13 we have:
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Fig. 13 Frequencies of violation of YRA under IAC for
Hare and Coombs with large electorates and 0 % 9 % 1.
As seen above, it appears that: (i) in general, cases of violations are
rather rare, (ii) frequencies get smaller as the electorate gets larger, (iii)
greatest frequencies are reached for electorates with constituencies with
equal size, and Önally (iv) Coombs procedure is more sensitive to the vio-
lation of YRA than Hareís procedure.
6 Concluding discussion
This paper was devoted to the study of the sensitivity of sequential posi-
tional rules to Youngís reinforcement axiom. We obtain two types of results.
First, we give precision about the conÖgurations of preferences and the num-
ber of voters at which violations of the axiom occur, and second, we provide
frequencies of these occurrences. Most of these latter results are based on
computer simulations - under two probabilistic classical hypotheses - but
some other are obtained with the analytical Fishburn-Gehrlein technique.
Illustrations are given for the special cases of Hareís Procedure, Coombs
Procedure and Iterative Borda Procedure, and also for three actual Parlia-
ments (France, Germany and the United States).
Our results show that: (i) in general, cases of violations of YRA are
rather rare, (ii) although all frequencies are small, they are smaller for HP
and IBP than CP, and (iii) frequencies decrease for electorates with con-
stituencies with clearly uneven sizes.
Besides, although all these rules violate YRA, the frequencies of violation
are very rare. Then, since the violation of this axiom is not so frequent, one
should not be unduly worried about its theoretical possibility.
However, we can make some advice in order to avoid this paradox with
three alternatives. First, for small constituencies, indi§erently take HP, or
CP, or IBP, among all sequential positional rules. And second for large
electorates, use IBP rather than HP or CP.
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It must also be noted that in the special case where the winner in the
Örst constituency is the most preferred alternative of all voters in the second
constituency, the violation of Youngís reinforcement axiom coincides with
the no-show paradox (see for example Lepelley and Merlin 2001). However,
our results noticeably di§er from those of Lepelley and Merlin, mainly be-
cause, as underlined above, our simulations are based on an assumption of
independence between the two constituencies, which is not the case in their
study.
Finally, it is worth noting that it may be interesting to consider some
di§erent contexts: more than three alternatives, more general procedures
containing all SPRs (for example by possibly eliminating more than one
alternative at each step), or Condorcet consistent procedures.
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